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Abstract
In Western Europe, political commentators have been surprised by the apparent inability of
President Barack Obama to implement comprehensive social policy reform, with the exception of
health care legislation. Hopes that President Obama could become a new Roosevelt have been
disappointed, precisely at a time when the ‘Great Recession’ (–) has laid bare the challenge
of economic insecurity and poverty in contemporary America. Paradoxically, it is the Presidency’s
incapacity to address this challenge that partially explains the Democrats’ crushing electoral defeat
in the mid-term congressional elections in November .
This article explains this apparent political paradox in four stages. First, it defines the American
social contract – the dream of social mobility through hard work. Second, it shows how this dream
has been severely tested by the rise of economic insecurity since the late s and finally the Great
Recession. Third, it analyses the social policy responses to the recession, namely the American
Recovery Act. To conclude, the comparative timidity of the Obama administration’s response is
explained by a series of circumstantial and institutional constraints that limit the capacity of the
Presidency to implement comprehensive social reform.spol_ ..
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Introduction – A Fragmented Social Protection System
Historically there has been a strong link between financial crises, economic
recessions and social policy developments in the USA. Unemployment com-
pensation represents a direct policy response to the massive layoffs that char-
acterize the American labour market during financial crises. For instance, the
Social Security Act of  created unemployment insurance precisely to help
workers mitigate the impact of employment loss. During the Great Recession
of –, employers quickly adjusted the size of their workforces in response
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to changes in demand (CBO ). The flexibility of the US labour market,
with a low degree of employment protection, means that displaced workers
become quickly exposed to social risks, notably a loss of health care coverage.
As a result, Congress has to continuously extend unemployment insurance
beyond the statutory  weeks.
There is no comprehensive American welfare state in the European sense
of the word, with universal coverage of social risks such as the loss of employ-
ment, old age and poor health. Instead, American social policy is a two-tier
system, with the upper tier being social security, mostly contributory old age
benefits, survivors and disability benefits administered by the federal govern-
ment. The second lower tier represents the social assistance system. Pro-
grammes are built around the needs of poor families with children, practically
excluding childless individuals (Berlin : ). Such programmes are gener-
ally demeaning and deliver extremely meagre benefits.
I distinguish three periods in American social history. The first period
corresponds to the enactment of the modern American welfare state with the
Social Security Act of . The second (–) corresponds to the second
stage of development of American social policies, with a piecemeal expansion
of social security programmes and the creation of additional anti-poverty
schemes. The third entails restructuring and retrenchment for the most vul-
nerable, notably with the replacement of Aid to Families with Dependant
Children (AFDC) by Temporary Assistance with Needy Families (TANF) in
.
The Social Security Act ()
The Social Security Act of  established a sharp distinction between social
insurance and public assistance programmes. Whereas social security was
viewed as a ‘sacred governmental obligation’, welfare programmes were seen
as a ‘handout to barely deserving people’ (Skocpol : ). The law
established two social insurance programmes on a national scale to help meet
the risks of old age and unemployment: a federal system of old-age benefits for
retired workers and a federal-state system of unemployment insurance. The
Act also provided federal grants-in-aid to the states for the means-tested
programmes of Old-Age Assistance and Aid to the Blind. These programmes
supplemented the incomes of individuals who were ineligible for social insur-
ance programmes. Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) was the principal
component of the lower tier of the social security system. The basic idea was
that husbandless women should be able to look after their children in the same
way as white married middle-class women did (Skocpol ). This pro-
gramme was modified to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in
.
The Age of Expansion (–)
Public assistance programmes were broadened and expanded in an ad hoc
fashion between  and . The period – corresponds to the
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second stage of the expansion of the American welfare state. The War on
Poverty was launched through the Economic Opportunity Act of  in
order to improve the education and job opportunities of the poor. The
programmes included Neighbourhood Youth Corps to provide local training,
Community Action Programmes (CAPs) to promote urban renewal in
deprived areas and Head Start. However, there was no attempt to coordinate
anti-poverty programmes with economic policies. As a result, the Great
Society programmes oscillated between the implementation of active labour
market policies such as job-creation and training programmes and an attempt
to change the behaviour of the poor (Russel : –).
In addition, the Social Security Amendments of  created Medicare and
Medicaid. Medicare provided for the medical needs of persons aged  or
older regardless of income. Medicaid (federal grants to the states for Medical
Assistance Programmes) provided medical assistance for persons with low
income and resources. Finally, the public assistance provisions of the Social
Security Act were broadened in . The cash assistance programmes for the
aged, blind and disabled were replaced by the mainly federally administered
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programme.
The Food Stamps programme was created in  to improve the nutrition
of low-income families. The programme was placed under the responsibility
of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). The other nationally uniform
programme for low-income individuals is the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC). EITC was initiated in  as a means to stimulate employment and
combat welfare dependency (Stoker and Wilson : ).
Restructuring and Retrenchment (–)
From the s onwards, support for working families was considerably
extended, whilst anti-poverty programmes were radically scaled back. In the
s, the debate on public assistance was dominated by a moral underclass
discourse with strong racial undertones (Gilens ). This discourse proved
extremely pervasive, and progressive democrats lost the battle of ideas in the
s (Weaver ; Daguerre , ).
The fact that the welfare caseload expanded in the s – the number
of AFDC recipients rose from approximately  million in  to  million
in  – accentuated the public perception according to which the
public assistance system was too generous and unsustainable. By the early
s, AFDC had become the most unpopular social programme in the
country (Weaver ). In August , President Bill Clinton signed
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act,
which replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF).
TANF ended entitlement to cash assistance and imposed a five-year limit
on welfare benefits. TANF funding mechanism was a block grant to each
individual state. The block grant was fixed and was based on the level of
expenditure in the mid-s under the old AFDC programme. The
primary goal of TANF was to reduce the welfare caseload, which had
reached a peak in –. The TANF funding mechanism provided a
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financial incentive for states to move families off welfare: if their caseload
declined, states could retain the funds that were used to pay benefits. TANF
was rated as a tremendous success on both sides of the political spectrum
(Daguerre ). The welfare caseload dropped from . million recipients
in March  to approximately  million recipients in September 
(DHHS and TANF ). In  TANF was reauthorized for another five
years.
Receipt of Food Stamps was also made increasingly conditional upon
complying with stricter work requirements, although such requirements were
much less draconian than those of the TANF programme. Work require-
ments apply to all working age individuals between  and . Individuals
must participate in training and accept employment offers (Stoker and Wilson
: ). Participation in Food Stamps declined dramatically from  to
, but steadily increased in , as the result of the recession. The Bush
administration (–) expanded the programme in . The Farm Secu-
rity and Rural Investment Act of  (FSRIA) relaxed eligibility criteria,
made Food Stamp benefits more accessible, softened sanctions in case of
overpayments to Food Stamp recipients. As a result, and in contrast to TANF,
Food Stamps represents the first most important programme for low income
families in contemporary American society.
The second most important programme for low-income families is the
EITC, the scope and the generosity of which has been steadily increasing
since the late s, in an attempt to promote ‘an alternative to welfare’. Since
, EITC benefits have been extended to childless workers, but benefits are
more generous if the individual has a qualifying child, that is, any child under
the age of  or under age  if a full-time student.
In the s, Presidents Bush (senior) and Clinton took several important
steps to provide medical assistance to children and to working families. In
, Medicaid coverage was expanded to include children under the age of
six and pregnant women in families with incomes below  per cent of the
poverty line. In an attempt to provide heath coverage to previously uninsured
low-income children, the Balanced Budget Act of  created the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP), a matching federal grant programme to
the states. CHIP does not provide coverage for parents and does not benefit
low-income workers without children. State and federal policies have thus
singled out children in the receipt of various cash assistance and in kind
programmes, but adults are increasingly excluded from this expansion as they
are expected to earn their living through paid work.
American social policy is based on the premise that the main source of
income for working age individuals should be their wages. Social programmes
should focus on helping low income workers as opposed to providing social
assistance recipients with hand outs (Stoker and Wilson : ). Benefits
should encourage work efforts either directly through in work subsidies such
as the EITC or directly through programmes such as Medicaid, Transitional
Medical Assistance (TMA), and, to a lesser extent, Food Stamps. Out of work
benefits are reduced to a meagre minimum and conditions of access are so
restrictive (as in TANF) that they act as a deterrent, thus coaxing benefit
recipients into taking any kind of paid employment.
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Rising Economic Insecurity and the Great Recession – The
Road to Collapse
The social equilibrium is based on the premise of a strong, dynamic labour
market with an abundance of low paid jobs. This equilibrium became
extremely fragile as a result of the continuing deterioration of labour market
conditions, with an increasing fraction of the population being exposed to
income insecurity and volatility (Hacker ). This equilibrium was also
based on the availability of cheap credit to sustain individual consumption.
With the rise in unemployment and the drying up of credit, as in the Great
Recession of –, this equilibrium collapsed.
Deterioration of labour market conditions
One of the most fundamental changes in recent American history is the rising
economic insecurity of the middle class. Such insecurity amounts to a funda-
mental breach in the American social contract as defined by the Social
Security Act in . This contract is based on the premise that working age
individuals should support themselves and their families through paid employ-
ment. The problem is that work no longer provides adequate protection
against social risks in contemporary American society.
According to Hudson (: ), three events increased the level of seg-
mentation in the American labour market: deindustrialization and the decline
of organized labour, a large increase in the relative size of immigrant work-
force, and the growing prevalence of non-standard work arrangements. Sec-
ondary labour markets are characterized by poverty level earnings, the
absence of employer provided health insurance, and employment in a job that
is limited or uncertain in its duration (Hudson : ). There are in fact
three labour markets, with a primary and secondary labour market but also an
intermediary labour market whose workers have no access to pension or
health insurance, or both. The intermediary labour market makes up about 
per cent of the labour market for wage and salary workers. A little more than
a third of American wage and salary workers have jobs in the primary market
while almost one in five is employed in the secondary labour market. Cru-
cially, ‘between the early s and the late s labour market dualism
increased substantially and there was also a substantial redistribution of jobs
from the primary to the secondary labour markets’ (Hudson : ).
Since the mid-s the earnings of male workers have become more
unstable, with a major effect on overall income stability. Transfer incomes –
cash benefits received by families – have also grown more unstable since the
s (Rockefeller Foundation : ).
Meanwhile, health care costs continued to increase and it was only during
mid-s’ job miracle that employers in the retail and hospitality sector
offered generous and affordable health care plans in an effort to lure prospec-
tive employees. As soon as the economy started to deteriorate again, in ,
employers dropped the comprehensive health care plans which had benefited
low-paid workers. But neither the expansion of EITC nor the piecemeal
broadening in Medicaid coverage could compensate for the decline in wages
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and the rise in health care costs respectively. This explains the major increase
in financial insecurity since the mid-s.
Rising economic insecurity
The most significant phenomenon in the last  years has been the rise of
financial insecurity as measured by the economic security index (Rockefeller
Foundation ). This measures the share of Americans who experience at
least a  per cent drop in their available family income whether due to a
decline in income or an increase in medical spending or a combination of the
two, and who lack an adequate financial safety net to catch them when they
fall. A higher ESI therefore indicates greater insecurity. According to the ESI,
financial insecurity has increased. Indeed, in , . per cent of Americans
experienced a major economic loss sufficient to classify them as insecure in the
ESI. During the recession of the early s, this had risen to  per cent. In
, the picture had improved (. per cent), but measured insecurity
remained higher than in the s. Projections suggest that in , the level
of economic insecurity experienced by Americans was greater than at any
time over the past quarter century, with approximately one in five Americans
(. per cent) experiencing a decline in available household income of  per
cent or greater (see figure ).
Figure 
Risk of financial loss has increased from  to  for all Americans (with –
projections)
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Source: Rockefeller : .
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By the early s the purchase of the American dream – an education, a
car, a house, combined with regular trips to the mall – had become increas-
ingly unaffordable, thus squeezing middle-class families, precisely when
labour market rewards reached an all time low (Hacker ). However, there
was no political pressure to expand income transfers partially because of the
low salience of inequality-related issues but also because of easy access to
borrowing allowed low and middle-income households to sustain consump-
tion or to purchase a home (Brandolini : –; Appelbaum ). The
American dream rested on gigantic levels of personal debt, with devastating
consequences for those households affected by the mortgage crisis in the
summer of , which marked the onset of the Great Recession (–).
The Great Recession
Because so many Americans rely solely on the labour market and access to
credit to sustain their livelihoods, when these two sources of income dried up
simultaneously, as in –, American citizens found their lives literally
turned upside down.
Even prior to the Great Recession, there was a gradual increase in national
poverty rates in the previous – years. While there was a sizeable decline
from  until , poverty rates have increased to almost the same rates
since the early s and s in similar recessionary periods (see figure ). A
similar trend occurs by age. With the exception of seniors of  years and
older, the poverty rate for all other age groups has risen with the highest
increase for individuals under  at . per cent (see figure ). The rates for
poverty in minors are reaching recessionary levels from the early s and
Figure 
Number in poverty and poverty rate: –
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Source: US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey  to  Annual Social and
Economic Supplements.
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s. Among ethnic groups, Blacks have the highest poverty rate reaching
. per cent, followed by Hispanics with . per cent; however, poverty rates
are still below those during the s and s (see figure ).
Although income insecurity and poverty were by no means the sole pro-
blems of a minority, the Great Recession laid bare the holes of the American
safety net. In a context of historically high unemployment rates by US stan-
dards ( per cent in December , . per cent in November ), the
social protection system was unable to contend the rising tide of poverty and
hunger. In , nearly million Americans were poor, including nearly one
in five children, and hunger – defined as inadequate access to food – affected
more than  million Americans, including almost one in four children (Insti-
tute for Policy Studies ).
The crisis had been most severe in America’s industrial heartland. Two
million manufacturing jobs had been lost in the recession, thus accentuating
the pattern of de-industrialization which has characterized the evolution of
the economy since the s (Institute of Policy Studies : ). Moreover,
underemployment was also on the rise, with blue-collar workers being the
hardest hit. The study Battered by the Storm estimates that the number of
underemployed workers had risen to  million, which made the combined
total of underemployed and unemployed .million workers, or . per cent
of the workforce. Poverty had also risen, and in  about million people,
or . per cent of the population were living in poverty, the highest level in
over a decade. In addition, people of colour and children were suffering the
most. As housing aid programmes had been cut back since the s, low
income individuals were often left with the option of either paying for food or
rent. Food Stamps had become the only means-tested programme for low-
income individuals and their dependants, but benefits levels are very low and
Figure 
Poverty rates by age: –
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Economic Supplements.
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only cover food expenses. In the recession, as unemployment increased, more
individuals qualified for Food Stamps (SNAP), thus increasing the volume of
Food Stamps caseloads (see figure ). According to the report Battered by the
Storm, in August , . million Americans (. million households)
Figure 
Unemployment rate and number of supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP),
unemployment insurance, temporary assistance for needy families (TANF) recipients
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Source: Ron Haskins, the Brookings Institution,  January , Comments on Social Safety
Net Volume, http://www.urban.org/events/firsttuesdays/upload/Haskins-Social-Safety-
Net.pdf (accessed  January ).
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received SNAP benefits, a one-third increase in participation since the reces-
sion began, and one in eight Americans was receiving Food Stamps, an
all-time high (Institute for Policy Studies : ).
Political commentators and scholars multiplied the calls for ‘a society of
opportunity’, in true American tradition (Hacker ; Haskins and Sawhill
). But in extremely unequal society, social opportunity had become the
privilege of an oligarchy, whose capacity to influence policymakers was much
greater than that of the middle class (Winters and Page ). It was in this
context that the presidential candidate Barack Obama ran his campaign in
. For the first time in decades, the presidential hopeful raised the issue of
social justice and ran on a platform of change, repeatedly challenging the
Republican policies of tax cuts for the most affluent (Mettler : ). In his
accepting nomination speech at the Democratic National Convention in July
 in Denver, he underlined that he was here to restore America’s promise,
a society of opportunity for those who work hard:
Our government should work for us, not against us. It should help us, not
hurt us. It should ensure opportunity not just for those with the most
money and influence, but for every American who’s willing to work.
That’s the promise of America – the idea that we are responsible for
ourselves, but that we also rise or fall as one nation; the fundamental
belief that I am my brother’s keeper; I am my sister’s keeper.
It is important to underline, however, that it was only in the last stages of the
presidential campaign, in September , that the financial crisis really
started to unfold. Whilst the Bush administration adopted the Economic
Stimulus Act in February , its main intervention consisted in bailing out
the banks with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In January 
the new Obama administration had to address the social consequences of the
crisis. What has been the Obama administration’s response to the plight of
middle-class and low-income individuals?
The Obama Administration’s Policy Response –
Not Bold Enough?
The apparent similarities between the Great Depression and the Great Reces-
sion led pundits to draw parallels between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and
Barack Obama.
George Packer in The New Yorker wrote:
For the first time since the Johnson Administration, the idea that gov-
ernment should take bold action to create equal opportunity for all
citizens doesn’t have to explain itself in a defensive mumble. That idea is
ascendant in  because it answers the times. These political circum-
stances, even more than the election of the first black American to the
highest office, make Obama’s victory historic. Whether his Presidency
will be transformative, in the manner of Roosevelt and the handful of
predecessors named by F.D.R. in , will depend, in part, on history –
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it’s unclear whether today’s financial troubles will offer a political chal-
lenge, and an opportunity, of the magnitude of the Great Depression.
(Packer )
In the early months of the Obama presidency there was a sense of opportu-
nity, neatly captured by Rahm Emanuel, the White House chief of staff, when
he declared ‘you don’t ever want a crisis to go to waste’ (cited in Krugman
). Similarly, in the Washington Post, President Obama wrote about the
sense of urgency of his fellow citizens:
What Americans expect from Washington is action that matches the
urgency they feel in their daily lives – action that’s swift, bold and wise
enough for us to climb out of this crisis. Because each day we wait to
begin the work of turning our economy around, more people lose their
jobs, their savings and their homes. And if nothing is done, this recession
might linger for years. Our economy will lose  million more jobs.
Unemployment will approach double digits. Our nation will sink deeper
into a crisis that, at some point, we may not be able to reverse. That’s
why I feel such a sense of urgency about the recovery plan before
Congress. (Obama b)
The tone of these speeches, the sentiment that these were extraordinary times
for America and that the country was at a crossroad owing to the financial
meltdown, allowed the media to replay the drama of the Great Depression,
with Barack Obama stepping in the shoes of FDR.
However, as pointed out by Skocpol and Jacobs (), and Mettler
(), the analogies between the Great Depression and the Great Recession
are more apparent than real. Three main differences can be identified.
First, a crucial difference was the timing of Obama’s access to power. By
contrast to Franklyn Delano Roosevelt, who acceded to the Presidency in
, i.e. three years after the financial crisis of , Barack Obama became
President in January , at a time when the full consequences of the crisis
were still unknown – and, as it turned out, vastly underestimated (Krugman
; Appelbaum ).
Second, Republicans and Southern Democrats were ready to support very
extensive job creation programmes as a result of the severity and the length of
the Great Depression. Indeed, by  all other courses of action had been
exhausted. This was not the case for Barack Obama, who faced from the start
fierce opposition from the Republicans in Congress, notably in the Senate. He
thus had to compromise to obtain the vote of Independents such as Joe
Lieberman and moderate Republicans like Olympia Snowe in order to avoid
a filibuster. Unfortunately for Barack Obama, he looked increasingly like a
talented deal broker as opposed to a decisive President inspired by a vision for
America. To disillusioned voters, talks behind closed doors seemed very
similar to the ‘old Washington ways’ that the President had so eloquently
denounced in his campaign.
Third, unlike FDR, with the exception of health care reform, Barack
Obama did not plan to create new social programmes. Instead, the White
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House intended to build upon existing social policies, largely continuing the
politics of tax cuts and piecemeal extension of Medicaid and Food Stamps
which characterized the action of the Clinton and Bush administrations. The
strategy of expansion by stealth underpinned the Recovery Act signed by
President Obama in February .
The Recovery Act made tax cuts the primary vehicle for providing relief
to Americans: tax cuts amounting to US$ billion,  per cent of the
US$ billion stimulus package. The largest of these tax cuts was the
President’s Proposal Making Work Pay Tax Credits which was based on
extension of EITC (Mettler : ). The Recovery Act represented an
extremely generous stimulus package that sought to counteract the absence of
automatic stabilizers in the US social protection system. According to the
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, ‘seven provisions of the recovery
act . . . – including three tax credits for working families, two improvements in
unemployment insurance, expanded nutrition assistance, and one-time pay-
ments to senior citizens, veterans, and people with disabilities – and estimated
that these provisions will result in . fewer Americans (including . million
children under ) being counted among the nation’s poor in ’ (Pavetti
).
Unemployment insurance (UI) provides a safety net for workers who have
lost their jobs through no fault of their own. The duration of unemployment
insurance is  weeks in most states, but historically the federal government
funds additional weeks of benefits in response to an economic downturn.
American social policy rests on the assumption that unemployment will be
necessarily of short duration, except in harsh economic times, when Congress
can extend the duration of benefits. Neither Food Stamps nor Medicaid
represents a nationwide safety net for the unemployed, as these programmes
provide benefits in kind (Atkinson and Micklewright ). Moreover, unem-
ployment insurance excludes a great number of people with erratic work
history or who have left their employment without ‘good cause’, accentuating
further the economic hardship of these individuals and their dependants.
Indeed, in  only  per cent of unemployed workers in low-income
families reported receiving unemployment compensation, compared with 
per cent in moderate-income families and  per cent in higher income
families. Former TANF recipients are particularly vulnerable and very few
qualify for the benefits when losing their jobs (Simms : ).
As many low-wage workers tend to be new entrants into the labour
market or have difficulties holding down jobs especially when they have
family dependants and child care issues, cycling back between benefits and
jobs is a relatively common occurrence. Short-term job tenure reduces
workers’ chances of qualifying for unemployment compensation. The
earning requirement is usually based on income earned in the earliest four
of the five quarters completed before unemployment, and as a result earn-
ings in the last quarter do not count. Typically short-term employees find it
hard to qualify. In addition, in order to qualify, workers must have left their
employment for a good cause. Pregnancy, child care issues, domestic prob-
lems or a spouse’s job-related move are not considered good reasons for
employment contract termination, thus making it difficult for women with
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child care responsibilities or domestic issues to qualify for UI in a number
of states. Women who may want only part-time work do not qualify for UI
in  states. In addition, due to the severity and the length of the current
recession, nearly  per cent of UI claimants had exhausted their regular UI
benefits in .
In response to the recession, in  Congress created the Emergency
Unemployment Compensation Programme (EUC), which provides up to 
weeks of additional benefits to unemployed individuals who have exhausted
their state benefits. The Recovery Act adopted in February  extended this
programme through December  (Pavetti ). The Recovery Act
included financial incentives for states to broaden the scope of unemployment
benefits. Additional funding (US$ billion) was allocated to increase benefit
levels by US$ a week. In November , Congress approved a further
extension of up to  additional weeks in every state, with an extra six weeks
of benefits for those workers in states with an average three month unemploy-
ment rate above . per cent (Institute for Policy Studies : –). The
most recent additions to unemployment insurance and benefit extensions
came with HR , The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthori-
zation and Job Creation Act in November of . The bill extended tax cuts
while simultaneously extending unemployment insurance and unemployment
benefits until December .
Under the Recovery Act, all public assistance programmes received addi-
tional funding whilst the scope and the level of benefits was tremendously
enhanced. Last but not least, the Recovery Act also provided an additional
US$ billion for employment and training initiatives under the Work Invest-
ment Act of  (WIA). The Act also made clear that services should be
provided primarily to recipients of public assistance and other low-income
individuals. This provision existed already in the WIA, but this clause was
never really implemented, which justified this precision in legislative language.
How can we qualify the approach of the Obama administration in relation
to welfare reform and the safety net and was there a break with the approach
of the Bush administration (–)? Three characteristics emerge from the
analysis of the Recovery Act and from interviews conducted in December
 with senior officials from the Department of Labor and the Office of
Family Assistance in the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS). Experts within various think tanks such as the Center for American
Progress, Brookings and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities were also
interviewed.
First, the Obama administration’s response built upon existing public
assistance programmes, notably Food Stamps, unemployment insurance
and, to a lesser extent, TANF. The Recovery Act, however insufficient
according to many liberals, remained an exceptionally generous financial
effort to raise the nation’s safety net and to alleviate the plight of low-income
families. According to Ron Haskins, a Republican expert on welfare reform
at Brookings, ‘the act was very generous. The Obama administration is
outrageously liberal, they have done a lot for low-income families’ (interview
with Ron Haskins, Brookings, Washington DC, December ). In the
words of a career civil servant in the Office of Family Assistance commenting
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on the Obama administration, ‘their heart is in the right place. The others
could not care less’ (interview, Office of Family Assistance, Washington DC,
December ).
Second, there is a new emphasis on well-paid jobs which require post-
secondary education, as the best way to raise the general level of skills,
promote the competitiveness of the US workforce at the global level and
ensure that Americans are prepared to take up new job opportunities (Office
of Management and Budget ). The administration believes that some of
the jobs that have been destroyed in the manufacturing sector will not come
back, thus enhancing the need to prepare American workers and young
people to get a better education in order to have access to good jobs. This
agenda is driven by the President himself, who has called for each American
to commit ‘at least one year or more of higher education or career training’
(Obama a).
To this end the administration has launched the New American Gradua-
tion Initiative, announced by Barack Obama on  July . The initiative
aims to add  million college graduates by , and devotes US$ billion to
community colleges. The programme will help students who cannot afford
four-year university education as well as adults who want to get better skills
(Washington Post ). In sum, for the Obama administration, individuals
must become or remain employable in a competitive labour market. An
improved distribution of skills and education in the US labour force should
suffice to address the problems of income insecurity. The problem is that the
unemployment remains high (. per cent in December ). According to
some critics (Krugman ), the Obama administration has failed to respond
adequately to the severity of the job crisis. However, social policy reform in
the USA remains extremely difficult due to a set of circumstantial and insti-
tutional constraints.
Conclusion – Circumstantial and Institutional Constraints
Impede Social Reform
By circumstantial constraints I essentially mean two different but interrelated
phenomena. First, the polarization of American politics and the shift to the
right. Second, the incapacity of the White House to frame a coherent eco-
nomic narrative that would win over voters disappointed by the partial failure
of the Recovery Act.
Since the mid-s the centre of political gravity has decisively moved to
the right, both within the Democratic and Republican parties. Although
President Barack Obama repeatedly urged Republicans and Democrats to
overcome their differences for the greater good of the nation in extremely
difficult times, this bipartisan rhetoric was completely ineffective and, to some
extent, counterproductive. Even in early , that is, before the mid-term
 elections, the chronic lack of discipline amongst Congressional Demo-
crats meant that President Obama had to compromise with Conservative
Democrats and Independents to ensure support for legislative reform, espe-
cially in the Senate (Skocpol and Jacobs : –). By contrast, there was
much more unity within the Republican party, and Obama’s original stimulus
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plan gained virtually no votes from Congressional Republicans (Skocpol and
Jacobs : ). Moreover, Republican opposition hardened and became
bolder as the Tea Party movement gained political momentum, thus weak-
ening the White House and its political allies.
In this adversarial climate, any seemingly liberal initiative is immediately
seized upon by Republicans, thus paralyzing the administration. A typical
example is TANF reauthorization: any attempt to change the legislation and
to re-establish a sense of entitlement to cash assistance would be immediately
exploited by Republicans as an attempt to undermine the work ethic and to
reward welfare dependency. In the words of an interviewee, ‘this is a highly
toxic debate’. As a result, the administration has preferred to steer clear of any
controversy and has chosen not to reopen this Pandora’s box publicly.
Second, the Recovery Act failed to win over impoverished Americans to
the cause of social spending precisely because it was not bold enough to visibly
improve the daily experiences of these citizens. The White House’s strategy
was based on the hope that jobs would come back in tandem with economic
growth, and it did not seem to have any other plan when this hope failed to
be realized in  (Skocpol and Jacobs : ). Moreover, expansionary
policy at the federal level was undercut by spending cuts and tax increases at
the state level, especially as states are not allowed to run a deficit. Finally, the
White House, then absorbed in the battle over health care, did not explain the
Recovery Act’s incomplete success. To keep repeating, as Democrats did
during the mid-term election campaign, that job losses would have been far
worse without the stimulus package was essentially a defensive position. This
line could not measure up to the incessant Republican message that federal
spending was the cause of the nation’s economic woes, and that there was no
difference between the bail out (TARP) and the Recovery Act. The Tea Party
movement played on the idea that Washington politics always benefit the rich
and powerful, which again reinforced the ideological backlash against federal
government and social spending.
Alongside these circumstantial constraints, three sets of institutional con-
straints impede the development of comprehensive social reform in the USA.
First, the White House’s strategy of building upon existing social programmes
is limited by the invisibility and the fragmentation of these programmes.
Second, political institutions in the USA are much more responsive to pro-
business and wealthy individuals’ interests. Third, the complexities of the
legislative process limit the influence of the presidency and make it difficult to
enact ambitious new social welfare programmes (Jacobs and King : ).
First, the American welfare state is hidden (Howard ), divided (Hacker
) and submerged (Mettler ). Almost a third of social spending in the
American welfare state consists of tax breaks, notably the EITC and home
mortgage reduction, which are much less visible than social programmes such
as TANF, unemployment insurance, Food Stamps and social security. The
problem with tax breaks is that they have less of a simulative effect than direct
spending, which means that they are also less likely to be supported by
potential beneficiaries. Moreover, the lack of comprehensive coverage, the
superposition of layers of social programmes without any single coherent
logic, the superposition of federal and state rules add to the complexity of
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social policies. The invisibility and complexity of social programmes ‘do little
to engender positive attitudes among recipients toward such policies’ (Mettler
: ). Unlike FDR in –, Barack Obama is not starting from
scratch but is instead trying to redirect resources and programmes in a more
redistributive way.
Health care reform is a case in point. Historically the pre-eminence of
market mechanisms in health care conditioned the development of the Ameri-
can welfare state. Indeed, as Béland and Hacker explain (: ), private
social benefits originally limited the scope of government intervention.
National health insurance plans were rejected when the Social Security Act
was adopted in ; the multiplication of tax breaks for employers and fringe
benefits in the s and s enabled to establish private schemes as a
credible alternative to a federal health insurance scheme, thus limiting the
scope of government intervention to older workers and to the poor, with the
creation of Medicare and Medicaid in . This is what Béland and Hacker
() call private policy feedbacks. With the benefit of insight, this helps
understand why a public health insurance proposal – the public option in the
Obama health care plan – was swiftly rejected in the Senate in the fall of .
Health care reform takes place under totally opposite premises in Europe and
the USA: whilst in Europe health care provision has been subjected to a logic
a logic of creeping privatization, in the USA health care has been nationalized
by stealth, almost timidly except for the elderly and to a lesser extent young
people, with considerable state variation in terms of health coverage.
Second, comprehensive social reform is particularly difficult enterprise as
pro-business interests enjoy much more political influence than low income
Americans who may not even vote regularly (Skocpol and Jacobs : ).
Moreover, there is no organic alliance between organized labour and the
Democratic Party, and the influence of trade unions has been in steady
decline since the mid-s. Congress is much less responsive to the demands
of low income citizens than to the demands of wealthy individuals and cor-
porations (Bartels ). In fact, American political scientists have recently
rediscovered the mechanisms of contemporary class war: Hacker and Pierson
() explain how since the late s the most affluent members of society
continuously expanded their financial position to the detriment of labour and
middle class interests through a logic of policy drift. In this context, any
additional spending on existing programmes or the introduction of new social
policies can be portrayed as socialist or anti-American, as the influence of the
Tea Party movement, duly relayed by Fox News, has made it clear over the
summers of  and . In short, opponents of social programmes are
much better funded, organized and programmatically coherent than their
supporters (Jacobs and King : ).
Third, the power of the Presidency in initiating legislative reforms is
severely limited by the complexities of a legislative process that is both ‘indi-
vidualised and diffuse, and therefore nearly immune to efforts by presidents to
form supportive coalitions’ (Jacobs and King : ). Indeed, as neither
Congressional leaders nor presidents can control the vote of legislators even
when one party is in control of both the White House and Congress, as was
the case before the mid-term congressional elections in November , the
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lawmaking capacity of the White House is extremely constrained (Jacobs and
King : ). There is considerable delay and deadlock in the legislative
process, which reinforces the rejection of Washington politics by ordinary
citizens and accentuates the impression of elites talking to themselves over
byzantine legislative details.
References
Appelbaum, E. (), Obama Administration Economic Policy in the Great Reces-
sion, Symposium A New American Deal, for Whom? Work, Employment and
Society Conference, September, Brighton.
Atkinson, A. B. andMicklewright, J. (), Unemployment Compensation and Labor
Market Transitions: A Critical Review, Journal of Economic Literature, XXIX: –
.
Béland D. and Hacker J. (), Ideas, Private Institutions, and American Welfare
State ‘Exceptionalism’: The Case of Health and Old-Age Insurance, –,
International Journal of Social Welfare, , : –.
Bartels, L. M. (), Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Berlin, G. L. (), Rewarding the Work of Individuals: A Counterintuitive
Approach to Reducing Poverty and Strengthening Families, The Future of Children,
special issue, The Next Generation of Antipoverty Policies, , : –.
Brandolini, A. (), Political Economy and the Mechanics of Politics, Politics and
Society , : –.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (), Losing a Job During a Recession,  April,
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/xx/doc/JobLoss_Brief.pdf (accessed 
January ).
Daguerre, A. (), Active Labour Market Policies and Welfare Reform: Europe and the US in
Comparative Perspective, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Daguerre, Anne (), The second phase of US Welfare Reform, –:
blaming the poor again? Social Policy and Administration, , : –.
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) (), Eighth Annual Report to Congress, Washington, DC:
Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation.
Gilens, M. (),Why Americans Hate Welfare, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago
Press.
Hacker, J. (), The Divided Welfare State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacker, J. S. () The Great Risk Shift, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Hacker, J. S. and Pierson P. (), Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political
Organisations, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, Politics
and Society, , : –.
Haskins, R. and Sawhill I. (), Introducing the Issue, The Future of Children, special
issue, The Next Generation of Antipoverty Policies, , : –.
Howard, C. (), The Hidden Welfare State, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hudson, K. (), The new labour market segmentation: Labour market dualism in
the new economy, Social Science Research, : –.
Institute for Policy Studies (), Battered by the Storm, http://www.ips-dc.org/reports/
battered-by-the-storm.
Jacobs, L. R. and King D. S (), Varieties of Obamaism: Structure, Agency, and
the Obama Presidency, Perspectives on Politics, , : –.
Krugman, P. (), Franklyn Delano Obama? New York Times,  November.
Krugman, P. (), This is not a recovery, New York Times,  August.
S P & A, V. , No. , A 
©  Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Mettler, S. (), Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of Social
Policy Reform in the Obama Era, Perspectives on Politics, : –.
Obama, B. (a), Excerpts of the President’s remarks in Warren, Michigan, July,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/excerpts-of-the-presidents-remarks-
in-warren-michigan-and-fact-sheet-on-the-american-graduation-initiative.
Obama, B. (b), The Action Americans Need, Washington Post,  February.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (), A New Era of Responsibility, Renewing
America’s Promise, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy_new_era/a_
new_era_of_responsibility.pdf (accessed  December ).
Packer, G (), The New liberalism, how the economic crisis can help Obama
redefine the Democrats, The Yew Yorker,  November.
Pavetti, LaDonna (), Testimony: LaDonna Pavetti, Director of Welfare Reform
and Income Support, on the Safety Net’s Response to the Recession, Before the
House Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support, October, http://
www.cbpp.org/files/--testimony.pdf (accessed  December ),
p. .
Rockefeller Foundation (), Economic Security at Risk, http://www.
economicsecurityindex.org/assets/Economic%Security%Index%Full%
Report.pdf (accessed  December ).
Russel, J. (), Economics, Bureaucracy, and Race, How Keynesians Misguided the War on
Poverty, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Simms, M. (): Weathering Job Loss: Unemployment Insurance, Urban Institute, http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/_job_loss.pdf (accessed December ).
Skocpol, T. (), The Limits of the New Deal System and the Roots of Contempo-
rary Welfare Dilemmas. In M. Weir, A. S. Orloff and T. Skocpol, The Politics of
Social Policy in the United States, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. –
.
Skocpol, T. (), Protecting mothers and soldiers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the
United-States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Skocpol, T. and Jacobs, L. R. (), Reaching for a New Deal: Ambitious Gover-
nance, Economic Meltdown, and Polarized Politics in Obama’s First Two Years,
prepared for the Working Group on Obama’s Agenda and The Dynamics of US
Politics, Russel Sage Foundation, New York.
Stoker, R. P. andWilson, L. A. (),When Work is Not Enough, Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution.
Washington Post (), Obama announces community college plan,  July.
Weaver, K. (), Ending Welfare as we know it, Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution.
Winters, J. A. and Page, B. I. (), Oligarchy in the United States? Perspectives on
Politics : –.
S P & A, V. , No. , A 
©  Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
